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POLICY BRIEF
German Council on Foreign Relations
No Time  
to Lose for the EU 
Overcoming the Accession  
Stalemate in the Western Balkans
EU enlargement policy toward the Western Balkans has never been 
as contested as today. French President Emmanuel Macron has 
made reform of the EU accession process a precondition to open-
ing membership talks with Albania and North Macedonia. While 
the current stalemate severely undermines the EU’s reform and 
stabilization agenda in the region, it also offers an opportunity for 
an overhaul of the accession process, which is long overdue.
 – In March 2020, the European Council should give the green light 
to accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia while 
simultaneously spelling out guiding principles for reform.
 – Dividing the accession process into seven successive stages, as 
suggested by a recent non-paper from France, bears the risk 
of slowing it to stalemate and losing EU leverage on candidate 
countries.
 – Reform of the EU accession process should deliver a revision of 
monitoring and assessment mechanisms, an increase in the cost 
of non-reform for political leaders in the region, and a raised 
scale of EU action to achieve a systematic impact on the ground.
 – The initial Conference on the Future of Europe in 2020 would be an 
ideal occasion for inviting political and civil society representatives 
from the Western Balkans to take an active part and reinvigorate 
political dialogue about their long-term perspectives in the EU. 
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The EU’s starting position on enlarge-
ment policy in its new institutional 
cycle is tricky. How can EU actors over-
come the stalemate that the accession 
process is currently experiencing? How 
should they respond to the recently 
circulated non-paper specifying French 
demands for reform? Any redesign of 
the current accession process will need 
to address three central challenges 
that are spelled out below along with 
concrete measures for the EU to finally 
pull its weight in the Western Balkans.
CONTENTIONS ON 
ENLARGEMENT
When Athens and Skopje resolved their 
27-year name dispute by reaching the 
Prespa Agreement in June 2018, hopes 
were high that the rebaptized “Repub-
lic of North Macedonia” would finally 
be able to start EU accession talks. In-
deed, for the first time since the Eu-
ropean Commission recommended 
opening negotiations ten years ago, 
Greece lifted its veto. But it was France 
that denied its approval and continued 
to do so at the latest European Coun-
cil meeting on October 17–18, 2019. 
This, in turn, incited strong reactions 
by both EU institutions1 and numerous 
member states – among them Germa-
ny, Italy, and Poland – showing that the 
camp of supporters of the accession 
process is still large and vocal. Outgo-
ing Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker went as far as to call the re-
jection of North Macedonia, as well as 
its neighbor Albania, “a grave historic 
mistake.”2
The stalemate resulting from the Oc-
tober summit is the latest and most 
flagrant expression of a fading consen-
1  See, for instance, the joint letter by Presidents Donald Tusk, David Sassoli, Jean-Claude Juncker, and President-Elect Ursula von der Leyen on the opening of accession talks 
with North Macedonia and Albania from October 3, 2019: https://www.consilium.europa.eu//media/40906/20191003-accession-talks-appeal-signed.pdf?utm_source=dsms-
auto&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Joint+letter+by+Presidents+Tusk%2c+Sassoli%2c+Juncker+and+President-elect+von+der+Leyen+on+the+opening+of+accession+t
alks+with+North+Macedonia+and+Albania (accessed November 3, 2019).
2  Andrew Gray, “Juncker: EU’s North Macedonia, Albania Rebuff is ‘Historic Mistake,’” Politico, October 18, 2019: 
https://www.politico.eu/article/jean-claude-juncker-eu-north-macedonia-albania-rebuff-historic-mistake/ (accessed November 3, 2019).
3  European Commission, “A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans,” COM(2018) 65 final, Strasbourg, February 6, 
2018: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf (accessed November 3, 2019).
4  German Bundestag, “Einvernehmensherstellung von Bundestag und Bundesregierung zum Beitrittsantrag der Republik Albanien zur Europäischen Union und zur 
Empfehlung von Europäischer Kommission und Hoher Vertreterin vom 29. Mai 2019 zur Aufnahme von Beitrittsverhandlungen,” Drucksache 19/13509, September 21, 2019: 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/135/1913509.pdf (accessed November 12, 2019).
sus on whether, how, and how fast to 
integrate aspiring members. It funda-
mentally undermines previous com-
mitments and initiatives to reinvigo-
rate the EU integration of the Western 
Balkans, such as the Berlin Process, 
under which regular summits have 
been held since 2014, or the EU’s new 
enlargement strategy, which was 
launched in February 2018.3 At stake 
is no less than the question of wheth-
er membership for the Western Bal-
kans is still on the table – and thus al-
so the EU’s credibility and leverage in 
the region.
On a more positive note, President 
Emmanuel Macron’s demand for an 
overhaul of current accession method-
ology, which accompanied France’s re-
jection of fresh membership talks, has 
fueled EU debate on reform. This re-
form is long overdue as it has become 
evident that the accession process, 
as it is currently designed and imple-
mented, has not delivered on its prom-
ise to foster democracy and prosperi-
ty throughout the region. At the same 
time, fundamental bilateral disputes 
and state-building issues still linger. A 
reform is thus vital for ending the cur-
rent blockade of the accession process 
and erasing its shortcomings.
THE ACCESSION 
PROCESS ON ICE
Blockades of EU accession candidates 
from the Western Balkans have a long 
tradition. In the past, such blockades 
have originated from bilateral disputes 
between member states and accession 
aspirants – for example, between Slo-
venia and Croatia and, after the latter 
joined the EU, Croatia and Serbia. They 
have also stemmed from a strict inter-
pretation of accession conditionality, 
such as the Netherlands’ insistence on 
Serbia’s cooperation with the Hague 
Tribunal. The current stalemate, how-
ever, is qualitatively different. At the 
October Council, the most principled 
opposition to the opening of acces-
sion negotiations with two additional 
candidates was voiced by France. Re-
garding Albania, France was backed by 
Denmark and the Netherlands, but it 
stood alone with its veto against North 
Macedonia. President Macron turned 
down all compromise solutions, in-
cluding a German proposal that would 
have opted for a conditioned opening 
of accession negotiations. 
First, this latest episode revealed the 
blatant lack of a common understand-
ing among EU actors about the re-
quirements for reforms the two Bal-
kan countries were told to make and 
whether or not they had been met. In 
September 2019, the German Bunde-
stag followed the Commission’s rec-
ommendation to open accession talks 
with North Macedonia and Albania 
– only after it formulated a number 
of conditions for the latter that sur-
passed previous EU requirements.4 The 
Dutch parliament came to the conclu-
sion that North Macedonia, but not Al-
bania, was ripe for opening negoti-
ations, while France abruptly voiced 
concerns at the October Council that 
neither country was prepared enough. 
This cacophony of assessments raises 
serious questions about the objectivity 
of the process.
Second, Paris has made the continua-
tion of the enlargement process con-
tingent on prior reform of the EU. At 
the October Council, France made it 
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clear that it wants to see a change in 
the modalities of the accession process 
before negotiations can be opened 
with prospective members. Conse-
quently, the actual admission of new 
entrants could only take place once 
the EU as a whole has been reformed. 
France’s two comprehensive demands 
are addressed to member states, not 
candidate countries. Therefore, it 
may take months or – in the case of a 
far-reaching reform of the workings of 
the Union – even years to meet them.
Third, there are strong indications that 
domestic motives – specifically uneas-
iness on migration – are driving states 
that are skeptical of enlargement. Na-
tional populists should not be given 
any ammunition for stirring anti-mi-
gration and anti-EU sentiment before 
key elections. It is thus no coincidence 
that France insisted on postponing the 
presentation of 2019’s enlargement 
package until after European elections. 
Similarly, in May this year, the Dutch 
government asked the European Com-
mission to suspend visa-free travel for 
Albanian citizens after parliament vot-
ed in favor of such a measure.
These concerns are related neither to 
a candidate country nor its bilater-
al relations, but rather to the domes-
tic affairs of member states and the 
future of the EU integration project. 
When considering accession, it is fre-
quently stressed that hopefuls should 
advance “on the basis of their own 
merits,” but such developments effec-
tively suspend this formula. This not 
only affects Albania and North Mace-
donia – where Prime Minister Zoran 
Zaev already called early parliamenta-
ry elections – but also the region as a 
whole. The prospect of not advancing 
on their EU path, regardless of their 
achievements, is likely to undermine 
the candidate countries’ reform ef-
forts, including the EU-mediated dia-
logue between Kosovo and Serbia, the 
5  European Commission, “Mission letter by Ursula von der Leyen to László Trócsányi, Commissioner-designate 
for Neighbourhood and Enlargement,” Brussels, September 10, 2019: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/mission-letter-laszlo-trocsanyi_en.pdf (accessed November 3, 2019). 
implementation of the Prespa Agree-
ment, and the fight against state cap-
ture across the region.
It would be ill-advised to assert that 
France threw a wrench into the ma-
chinery of EU integration that was oth-
erwise functioning perfectly. Still, the 
current stalemate risks making things 
worse as it appears to be leading the 
EU to deliberately and unnecessarily 
renounce its capacity to shape devel-
opments in the region. EU leaders are 
well aware that they face fierce com-
petition by Russia, China, Turkey, and 
the Gulf states, which have stepped up 
their political and economic, as well as 
their cultural and religious presence in 
the region. Thus, then-designated Eu-
ropean Commission President Ursu-
la von der Leyen noted in her mission 
letter to the then-designated Commis-
sioner for Neighborhood and Enlarge-
ment that “external influence in the 
region has been growing significantly.”5 
To prevent the Western Balkans from 
Figure 1: Citizens Migrating from the Western Balkans  
to the EU 2018 (First Permits of Residence)
62.525
53.76434.778
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Montenegro
N. Macedonia
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230.635
Source: Eurostat database. First permits by reason, length 
of validity and citizenship (last updated 28.10.2019)
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further drifting away from the EU’s 
fold, it is therefore crucial to overcome 
the current blockade and, at the same 
time, address the dysfunctionalities of 
the accession process.
REFORMING ENLARGE-
MENT – OR PUTTING IT  
ON HOLD?
The French veto at the October Coun-
cil – accompanied by president Ma-
cron’s request to overhaul the current 
methodology of accession – has cat-
apulted enlargement policy and de-
bate on its reform to a top spot on the 
EU’s agenda. France specified its de-
mands in a short non-paper distribut-
ed to EU partners in November 2019.6 
At its core, it proposes to replace the 
35 negotiating chapters with seven 
successive stages along thematic pol-
icy blocs, in which candidate coun-
tries would gradually be included. The 
non-paper contains a number of ele-
ments that could considerably advance 
the integration of the Western Balkans 
into the EU, in particular a gradual in-
clusion in sectoral policies even be-
fore accession,7 an increase of financial 
means, and the demand for reversibil-
ity in cases of backsliding. Other prin-
ciples, such as the respect of precise 
criteria and the front-loading of issues 
6  “Non-paper: Reforming the European Union accession process,” November 2019: https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Enlargement-nonpaper.pdf (accessed November 26, 
2019).
7  The concept of sectoral integration reflected in the French non-paper had recently been suggested by Milica Delevic and Tena Prelec. See: Milica Delevic and Tena Prelec, 
“Flatter and faster: New Western Balkans pathways to the EU,” Views from the Council, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 24, 2019: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/
commentary_flatter_and_faster_new_western_balkans_pathways_to_the_eu (accessed November 3, 2019).
8  This also appears to be a major concern voiced by a joint non-paper from Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Slovenia that, in reaction to the French non-paper, 
requests “it should be possible to open groups of chapters in parallel and not consecutively.” See: Barigazzi, Jacopo, “9 EU countries push back on French enlargement revamp,” Politico, December 13, 2019: 
https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-enlargement-reform-pushback/?utm_source=RSS_Feed&utm_medium=RSS&utm_campaign=RSS_Syndication (accessed December 16, 
2019).
related to the rule of law, have already 
been part of the current enlargement 
strategy, but – as shown below – have 
not always been translated from paper 
into practice.
France’s proposal, however, also trig-
gers many questions about practi-
cal implementation and its effects, 
for example: How advanced would re-
forms related to rule of law need to be 
in the first stage of accession negotia-
tions before a country could move to 
the next level? What benefits would 
be offered to candidates in the ini-
tial four stages? And why would ac-
cess to the single market only follow 
in a fifth – rather late – stage in the 
accession process? Also, which solu-
tion should be applied to Montenegro 
and Serbia, countries which already 
find themselves in the midst of “tra-
ditional” membership talks structured 
by the 35 chapters? The most import-
ant caveat to the French model, how-
ever, concerns its consecutive charac-
ter. Accession preparations in a given 
area often need many years to be ac-
complished. Treating each area one af-
ter the other – rather than conducting 
them in parallel – might prolong nego-
tiations to an extent that keeps even-
tual EU accession out of sight for can-
didate countries.8 
With the French veto overshadowing 
the reform process, the pro-enlarge-
ment bloc among member states has 
an interest in ending the current stale-
mate as soon as possible. Paris, howev-
er, will most likely insist on not open-
ing accession negotiations with any 
further candidates before a new meth-
odology has been introduced. The 
process, thus, faces two risks. On the 
one hand, disagreement among mem-
ber states on the path to reform could 
prolong the detrimental blockade of 
the Western Balkans’ perspective for 
entering the EU. On the other, a hasty 
overhaul of the highly complex acces-
sion procedure might not lead to the 
reduction in dysfunctionality that is 
sought, but rather its increase. The 
ball is now in the court of the Europe-
an Commission. It is expected to pres-
ent its own proposal for a reform of 
the accession process in January 2020, 
which will then serve as a basis for fur-
ther discussion.
THREE KEY CHALLENGES 
TO REFORMING THE 
ACCESSION PROCESS
Despite happening under unfavorable 
circumstances, an overhaul of the ac-
cession process constitutes a unique 
opportunity to eradicate a number of 
substantial shortcomings that have 
hampered its effectiveness. Three 
paths for reform would allow the EU 
to better pull its weight in the West-
ern Balkans. Rather than offering one 
specific model, the proposed measures 
point to a number of challenges that 
need to be addressed in any redesign 
of the accession process. 
The discussion of reform proposals 
departs from the assumption that the 
A hasty overhaul of the  
highly complex accession  
procedure might not reduce its  
dysfunctionality
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goal of a gradual accession process 
needs to be full membership – provid-
ed that EU conditionality is genuinely 
fulfilled by candidate countries. In the 
region, a withdrawal of the accession 
perspective would be clearly perceived 
as a rejection and renouncement of the 
EU’s previous commitments. Any light-
er form of association would consid-
erably decrease the EU’s leverage on 
reform, in particular with regard to 
democratic standards and the rule of 
law. It would also hardly be enough to 
counter the influence of other foreign 
actors and may turn out to be detri-
mental to long-term stabilization in 
the region. Any makeover of the acces-
sion process thus needs to be based on 
a credible membership perspective. 
Improve Monitoring and Assessment 
Mechanisms
A fundamental stumbling block that 
has impeded the accession process for 
years is the lack of trust expressed by 
member states in the assessments de-
livered by the European Commission. 
Member states favoring strict con-
ditionality have repeatedly contest-
ed the criteria for (potential) candi-
dates to move to the next level in the 
accession process and their actual ful-
filment. This has already been the case 
in the opening of accession talks with 
Montenegro and Serbia, and, more re-
cently, as shown above, with Albania 
and North Macedonia. In addition, al-
though the European Commission 
concluded in July 2018 that Kosovo met 
all benchmarks set out in its Visa Lib-
eralization Roadmap, the Council has 
not yet granted the long-awaited visa 
free travel to Kosovar citizens. 
A similar problem arises with regard 
to the annual country reports issued 
by the European Commission. Across 
EU capitals, they are perceived to be 
politicized, often painting a too rosy 
or blurred picture of events on the 
9  Jovana Marovic, Tena Prelec, and Marko Kmezic, “Strengthening the Rule of Law in the Western Balkans: Call for a Revolution against Particularism,” Policy Study, Balkans in 
Europe Policy Advisory Group, January 2019: https://biepag.eu/strengthening-the-rule-of-law-in-the-western-balkans-call-for-a-revolution-against-particularism/ (accessed 
November 3, 2019).
ground. The reports do not allow cit-
izens from the region to grasp at a 
glance whether their government per-
formed well in bringing the country 
closer to the EU. Due to their vague 
and coded language, they require “in-
terpretation” by government officials 
or experts, which, in turn, leaves plen-
ty of room to distort the picture. Thus, 
there is a fundamental need to re-
form the EU reporting system in order 
to deliver an unambiguous and trans-
parent overall assessment. The Coun-
cil and the Commission need to pri-
oritize clarifying how the latter can 
undertake future assessments of can-
didates’ progress in a way that allows 
all member states to rally behind them. 
A greater role in this could also fall to 
the European Parliament, for example 
by linking the work of rapporteurs to 
European Commission reports.
In addition, analysts from Montene-
gro and Serbia underline that acces-
sion talks on rule of law chapters lack 
efficient monitoring and clear guide-
lines. This is despite the fact that the 
EU introduced a detailed rule of law 
mechanism in 2012 that provides for 
opening chapter 23 on judiciary and 
fundamental rights and chapter 24 on 
justice, freedom, and security at the 
very beginning of accession negotia-
tions. The political front-loading of re-
forms related to the rule of law should 
consequently allow for the establish-
ment of a track-record of implementa-
tion. In practice, however, action plans 
that were supposed to be “living doc-
uments” stimulating the reform pro-
cess have not been subject to regular 
updates, thus outliving current reform 
needs and leading to very selective im-
plementation.9 The “new approach” on 
the rule of law still allows the govern-
ments of the Western Balkans to put 
thorny measures on the backburner. It 
is thus high time to establish a moni-
toring and benchmarking system with 
clear priorities and timelines. This 
would also facilitate applying the over-
all balance clause in case of a severe 
deviation. The application of the clause 
would lead to the freezing of negotia-
tions on other chapters if progress un-
der chapters 23 and 24 significantly 
lags behind.
Enhance the Cost of Non-Reform
The accession process in its current 
design rewards politicians for main-
taining the status quo. It brings a large 
number of benefits to ruling elites in 
the Western Balkans by opening eco-
nomic opportunities and the constant 
inflow of pre-accession funds. Politi-
cians obtain positive media coverage 
when shaking hands with their coun-
terparts from Brussels and EU capitals 
and can impress voters with the prom-
ise of EU accession, which is still – in 
spite of everything – attractive. Po-
litical leaders across the region enjoy 
these advantages, regardless of 
The accession process in its current 
design rewards politicians for  
maintaining the status quo
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whether they conduct genuine reforms 
or are merely pretending to. What is 
more, the EU has turned a blind eye to 
backsliding on democratic standards 
and the rule of law in many instanc-
es in recent years. The losers here are 
the citizens of the Western Balkans, 
for whom – as the current mass exo-
dus and street protests show – living 
conditions are becoming less and less 
bearable.
Holding decision-makers account-
able for preventing reform requires 
inflicting a cost on them that should 
be as painstakingly high as that for 
ordinary citizens. One way to achieve 
this would be to make the disburse-
ment of pre-accession funds strongly 
dependent on a country’s actual per-
formance in key areas of the integra-
tion process – for example, on the 
rule of law and fundamental rights, on 
good relations with its neighbors, and 
socio-economic development. The 
current proposal of an IPA III regu-
lation is a first positive step in this 
direction10. To make it more effec-
tive, it also needs to contain a robust 
suspension clause that allows for the 
(temporary) withdrawal of funds in 
cases of backsliding or a prolonged 
standstill of reforms. 
Second, the EU needs a clear and out-
spoken form of communication about 
a country’s performance in approach-
ing (or drifting away) from the acces-
sion criteria. As discussed above, cur-
rent EU country reports do not live 
10  European Commission, “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III),” COM(2018) 465 final, Brussels, June 14, 2018.
up to this task. In addition to regu-
lar reporting, Brussels needs to speak 
up every time the violation of funda-
mental principles gives rise to con-
cern. This applies not only to infringe-
ments of democratic standards, the 
rule of law, and fundamental rights, 
but also to agitations and provocations 
against neighbors or other national 
groups within a given country. While 
interventions by member states might 
be perceived as biased, the European 
Commission would be the right body 
to voice criticism based on objective 
criteria that apply to all six Western 
Balkan candidates. In practical terms, 
such an approach would be an ultimate 
challenge for the new Commission-
er for Neighborhood and Enlargement 
Olivér Várhelyi to prove his indepen-
dence. He was nominated by Hungary, 
which itself has been under criticism 
for hollowing out rule of law standards 
and provides political asylum to for-
mer Macedonian Prime Minister Niko-
la Gruevski who fled his country in No-
vember 2018 to escape a jail sentence 
for corruption. 
Move from Symbolic to Systematic 
Impact 
Monitoring reforms and sanctioning 
their non-implementation is only one 
side of the coin. The other is the need 
to create both comprehensive and 
concrete incentives. Having in mind 
that actual accession is a medium- to 
long-term goal, accession candidates 
already need to be tied more closely to 
EU institutions, programs, and stan-
dards now. This includes – but does 
not rely solely upon – more financial 
resources. 
A special role could fall to the year-
ly Western Balkans summits, better 
known as the Berlin Process. It reached 
its goal insofar as it gave new momen-
tum and visibility to the EU enlarge-
ment agenda, particularly to issues of 
regional cooperation. Nevertheless, af-
There is a need to already step up 
funding considerably within the 
pre-accession period
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ter six rounds of high-level summits, 
interim stocktaking suggests that in 
many areas the outcomes remain at 
a symbolic level, instead of achiev-
ing real impact on the ground. Take, 
for instance, the establishment of the 
Regional Youth Cooperation Office 
(RYCO), which is frequently praised as 
one of the most important achieve-
ments of the Berlin Process. While the 
very existence of RYCO is a success in 
itself, its annual budget amounts to no 
more than two million euros to sup-
port projects in six countries. With 
these limited resources, the number of 
young people that youth exchange ac-
tivities throughout the region can ef-
fectively reach remains small. Other 
matters – such as the establishment 
of a common economic area, the res-
olution of bilateral disputes, reconcili-
ation, and the issue of missing persons 
– have floundered. In a new enlarge-
ment architecture, the Berlin Process 
could be embedded in a more institu-
tionalized setting that provides conti-
nuity above the yearly changing chairs. 
It would cover all areas of regional co-
operation for which bilateral negoti-
ations between the EU and accession 
aspirants do not provide a platform. 
This would also ensure that thorny is-
sues remain on the agenda and do not 
have to give way to ever new priorities.
Given the low levels of economic de-
velopment and strained budgetary re-
sources, there is a need to already step 
up funding considerably within the 
pre-accession period. Currently, there 
is a blatant gap between the financial 
support given to member states and 
accession candidates. For example, un-
der the instrument for pre-accession 
(IPA II), the six countries of the West-
ern Balkans have received 3.9 billion 
euros from 2014 to 2020. During the 
same period, the new member state 
11  See, for instance, these two texts: Matteo Bonomi and Dušan Reljić, “The EU and the Western Balkans: So Near 
and Yet So Far,” SWP Comment 53 (December 2017), p. 4: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/
comments/2017C53_rlc_Bonomi.pdf (accessed November 3, 2019);
Pierre Mirel, “European Union-Western Balkans: For a Revised Membership Negotiation Framework,” European 
Issue n°529, Fondation Robert Schuman (September 30, 2019): https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-
issues/0529-european-union-western-balkans-for-a-revised-membership-negotiation-framework (accessed 
November 3, 2019). 
Croatia alone has access to 10.7 billion 
euros of structural funds and has en-
countered serious problems in absorb-
ing this sudden cash inflow. To achieve 
a gradual increase in funding and bet-
ter support cost-intensive EU approx-
imation, experts have repeatedly pro-
posed opening structural funds to the 
Western Balkans.11 Ideally, the pro-
visions to include the region in the 
structural funds scheme would be in-
tegrated in current negotiations on the 
Multiannual Financial Framework for 
2021–2027. If this fails, funds could also 
be contributed by member states sup-
portive of the Western Balkans’ acces-
sion agenda, for instance in the frame 
of the Berlin Process.
Addressing the enormous brain drain 
that currently affects the region is 
another issue that may prove to be a 
game changer. In 2018 alone, 230,000 
citizens from the Western Balkans 
Figure 2: Comparison of Allocations under the Instrument  
for Pre-Accession (IPA II) and European Structural & Invest-
ment Funds for selected EU /Candidate Countries 2014-2020 
(in Millions of Euros)
Sources: Cohesion Data https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.
eu/countries.  
European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbour-
hood-enlargement/instruments/funding-by-country/ (both 
accessed 18.12.2019)
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obtained first permits of residence 
within the EU (see Figure 1, p. 3). 
Among them, around 62,000 Albanians 
left their country for the EU, which 
is roughly two percent of the popu-
lation.12 The current exodus not only 
negatively affects the economies of the 
region, but it also deprives it of young, 
highly educated, and open-minded 
people who could sustainably anchor 
the conducted reforms within state in-
stitutions and society. While mobili-
ty is currently a one-way street that 
leads from the region to the EU, spe-
cific programs promoting circular mi-
gration13 could encourage the return of 
a highly skilled workforce. 
More imminently, the Conference on 
the Future of Europe announced by 
Commission President von der Ley-
en to be launched in 2020 would be 
an ideal occasion to invite represen-
tatives, including civil society actors, 
from all six (potential) candidate coun-
tries.14 EU leaders could thus build on 
the example of the Convention on the 
Future of Europe in the early 2000s 
that included the prospective member 
states from Central and Eastern Eu-
rope. This would give members-to-be 
the chance to not only take, but also 
shape the outcome of discussions. An 
invitation would be even more appro-
priate as the conference title implies 
12  Calculations based on the Eurostat database “First permits by reason, length of validity, and citizenship,” last updated October 28, 2019 (accessed November 11, 2019).
13  See, for instance: Alida Vračić, “Luck like the Irish: How emigration can be good for the Western Balkans,” ECFR Policy Brief, January 31, 2019: https://www.ecfr.eu/
publications/summary/luck_like_the_irish_how_emigration_can_be_good_for_the_western_balkans (accessed November 3, 2019).
14  Proposal discussed at the Western Balkans Reflection Forum, Zagreb, October 16, 2019. The demand also figures in the joint non-paper circulated by nine member states 
in December 2019. See: Barigazzi, Jacopo, “9 EU countries push back on French enlargement revamp,” see note 8. 
15  Rym Momtaz and Andrew Gray, “Macron urges reform of ‘bizarre’ system for EU hopefuls,” Politico, October 16, 2019: https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-urges-
reform-of-bizarre-system-for-eu-hopefuls/ (accessed November 3, 2019).
that the future not only of the EU, but 
also of Europe as a whole will be at the 
center of discussion. 
ESCAPING THE DILEMMA
With enlargement skepticism paralyz-
ing the accession process and multi-
ple crises facing the EU from within, it 
may sound tempting and even reason-
able to slow down or suspend the inte-
gration of the Western Balkans into the 
EU. As French President Macron put it, 
the EU needs to bring its own house 
in order before inviting new friends.15 
However, time matters. Reforming the 
EU and preparing candidates for their 
eventual accession are two endeavors 
that can run in parallel and are even 
required to do so. This is not only due 
to the large amount of time that both 
processes need. Addressing the seri-
ous consequences of the roll-back of 
domestic reform, open state-building 
issues, and disillusioned citizens – not 
to mention of external actors yielding 
to expand their own political and eco-
nomic influence – cannot wait until 
the EU is again ready to invest atten-
tion and resources to the region.
Germany should clearly signal that 
an end to the current blockade and a 
reconfirmation of a credible EU per-
spective for the Western Balkans is 
one of its core European policy inter-
ests: The EU’s broader reputation as 
an international partner is at stake if it 
cannot even fulfil the ambition of re-
liably shaping relations with (poten-
tial) candidate countries in its imme-
diate neighborhood. In fact, a number 
of aspects of the French reform agen-
da – in particular the need for strin-
gent and precise accession criteria, the 
political front-loading of issues relat-
ed to the rule of law, and the creation 
of tangible benefits for citizens in the 
Western Balkans – resonate well with 
long-standing German demands and 
could thus serve as common ground 
for reform. However, it needs to be en-
sured that a redesigned accession con-
ditionality serves as an effective tool 
for transformation and not as a tool 
for preventing the integration of the 
Western Balkans into the EU. To this 
end, it will be crucial to link it to at-
tractive (financial) incentives and an 
early integration of accession aspirants 
in EU structures. 
To start with, in March 2020, the Euro-
pean Council could give the green light 
to accession talks with Albania and 
North Macedonia, which are sure to be 
lengthy. At the same time, it could spell 
out initial guidelines for a makeover of 
the accession process that could sub-
sequently be refined at the EU-West-
ern Balkans summit in May 2020. EU 
member states could thus escape the 
dilemma of having to choose between 
a hasty reform and a prolonged block-
ade of the accession process, while si-
multaneously sending a strong sig-
nal to candidate countries that their 
achievements are being honored.
Germany should clearly signal that 
an end to the current blockade is one 
of its core European policy interests
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